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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEWIS

F.

HANSEN.

dba

Hansen Realty Company,

Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.

Case No.
9169

IVY B. SNELL.
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent takes no exception to the statement of facts
in the brtef of appellant. Such disagreement as exists between
the parties as to the evidence and in what light it is before
this Court will be pointed out in the argument.
It appears that there is duplication in the several points
enumerated in appellant's brief. evidenced by the fact that
points 5. 8, 9 and 10 simply incorporate by reference arguments
made under other captions.
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·As to the other points, respondent wili use the same numbers as those contained in the brtef of appellant but will state
the points affirmatively to respondent.
POINT 1.

SECTION 42-2-1 UCA 1953 DOES NOT
PRECLUDE MAINTENANCE OF THIS
ACTION.

This statute, which is quoted at page 17 of appellant's
brief, clearly distinguishes between the name which a party
may use for his business and the affidavit which a person
must file. The affidavit is to contain the full name of the
party; but the fictitious name, use of which brings the statute
into play, is the use of a name "other than the real name."
In this case the plaintiff has used his real surname, calling his
business the ''Hansen Realty Company.'' Hansen is the party's
real name and therefore the statute has no application to
this case. This is the plain conclusion of the annotations in
45 ALR 198 at 258, and 42 ALR 2d 516 at 558. The following cases in these annotations are in point: Johnston v.
Ellis, 49 Idaho 1, 285 p. 1015; Messick v. Haux Bros., 105
Cal. App. 637, 288 p. 434; Cone v. Ballou, 251 N.Y.S. 791;
Asplund v. Pearce, Porter & Martin, 181 Okla. 320, 73 P. 2d
866. This Court has not ruled on this question.
Even if it be assumed, for purpose of argument, that the
statute has application to the facts of this case, the authorities
are overwhelming that this is no bar or disability to bringing
action on a matter involved in the business. 45 ALR 198 at
208, 216; 42 ALR 2nd 516, at 524-525. There is no contrary
case to this assertion and the cases holding that the statute is
not a bar to maintenance of the action include the following:
Oakason v. Lisbon Valley Uran. Co. (D.C. Utah) 154 F.
Supp., 692; Galiafent v. Tucker, 48 Ida. 280, 281 p. 375:
Grody v. Scalone, 408 III. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 97; Ambro Adv.
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Agency v. Speed-Way Mfg. Co .. 211 Iowa 276. 233 N.W.
499. Again. this Court has not previously passed on this
question.
POINT 2.

THE AMOlJNT OF THE COMMISSION
WAS ESTABLISHED.

It is true that Exhibit 1-P calls for ''the Salt Lake Real
Estate Board Commission"; the complaint prayed for commission in the amount of $2,150 (R. 2) and there was no controversy whatsoever as to this being the correct amount.
Paragraph 6 of the complaint (R. 2) alleges "the real
estate commission called for by said Exhibit 1 is 5% of $43.000
or $2. 150." The amended answer in paragraph 11 "denies
that plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $2, 150 or any other sum
for a commission *** and alleges the fact to be that plaintiff
has in the manner above alleged been representing the proposed purchaser.'' ( R. 8) Thus no issue was made as to the
amount of commission but only to the question of whether
the commission had been earned.
No issue was made as to the amount of the commission
at the pre-trial. the Court thus framing issue No. 3: "Has
plaintiff performed in accordance with the terms of the said
contract so as to be entitled to receive and collect his commission?" (R. 12) The phrase, "his commission" could apply
to nothing other than the amount of commission as alleged
in the amended complaint. One of the purposes of pre-trial
is to reduce the issues.
POINT 3.

THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THE BUYER
TO HAVE CONTINUED TO BE READY.
WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE.

Appellant overlooks in his brtef the letter from the at3
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tomey for the purchaser of February 26, 1959 (Exhibit 7) as
specified in Finding No.7. (R. 88)
The buyer is shown by this letter and by its original contract (Exhibits 2, 11, 7) to be anxious to purchase this property
either for cash or on any terms as to payment which the seller
would specify, provided the interest be. the legal interest of
six per cent ( 6% ) . This interest continued right to the time
of trial. ( R. 20) Appellant is attempting to inject into "ready,
willing and able to buy'' an acceptance of the demand for ten
per cent interest. Whether this demand was within the power
of appellant to dictate as one of the "terms" is considered
under Point 4.
POINT 4.

WHERE THE CONTRACT IS SILENT AS
TO INTEREST THE LEGAL RATE OF
SIX PER CENT (6%) IS APPLICABLE.

As appellant recognizes, this is a two-part argument:
First, does the legal rate become the maximum where the contract does not specify a higher rate; and second, does discretion
as to "terms" include discretion to establish a rate of interest
higher than "the legal rate?"
As to the first point, the purpose of the statute seems to
be plain. The phrase "legal rate" does not apply to the rate
that will apply to judgments, nor to the maximum amount that
may be collected and seems to refer to the normaL ordinary
rate of interest that may be applied to actual or implied contracts where interest is called for and no rate has been agreed
upon. If this is not the purpose of Section 15-1-1, UCA, 1953.
then the purpose escapes us. This is the holding and the
rationale of the following cases: State v. Danielson, 22 U.
220, 223, 247 P. 2d 900; Baker Lumber Company v. Clark.
53 U. 336, 350, 178 P. 764; Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry
v. Colorado Animal By Products, 104 U. 385, 388, 140 P.
4
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2d 344; l\1cCarty v. Harris. 216 Ala. 265. 113 So. 233; Keystone Hardware v. Tague. 246 N. Y. 179. 58 N.E. 27. 53
A. L. R. 610; Cavanna v. Brooks. 97 N. J. Eq. 329. 127

At. 247. 37 A. L. R.

360. 374. 375.

Appellant wants to read in the phrase "terms to suit
seller" the power to fix interest rates. which. coupled with
other provisions. will enable the seller to raise the price if she
finds a purchaser eager to buy. This would make the contract
illusory and the conduct of the seller and the plaintiff fraudulent so far as the purchaser is concerned. A person listing a
property for sale at $43,000.00 could not find a better purchaser
than the plaintiff here has produced. Bennett Motor Company
was willing to buy the property for cash or upon any terms
which the seller cared to specify and has not balked at the
terms proposed by the seller, in the communication of January
26. except as to the rate of interest, which when combined
with the small monthly payment would compel the purchaser
to buy the property nearly twice over before it is paid for.
In order to make the problem more simple and still accurate, let us reduce the letter of January 26, 1959 ( R. 9)
to a proposal that the $43,000.00 be paid $5,000.00 down and
$4.800.00 per year at 10% per annum. Interest the first year
becomes $3,800.00 instead of $2,280.00, leaving a reduction
of principal in the amount of $1,000 instead of $2,520.00, or
more than twice the reduction in principal.
The 10% contract on the $38,000.00 would be paid off
in 17 years with total payments of principal and interest in the
amount of $78,898.00: Whereas at 6% it would be paid off
in 11 years and the total payments would be $52,937.00. Total
payments, including down payment of $5,000.00 would be
$83,898.00 as against $57,937.00 at 6% or a difference of
$25,961.00.

This obviously was a ruse not within the contemplation
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of any of the parties until the seller realized that the purchaser was anxious to purchase the land and not merely
"ready, willing, and able."
Did reservation of ''terms to suit seller'' include the power
to fix interest at higher than the legal rate7
Obviously "terms" does not include price in this instance,
since the price was stated in the sales agency contract. Likewise, it would seem, "terms" does not include interest since
interest is established by law at the legal rate unless the contract
specifies otherwise. "Terms" should therefore include only
those provisions and conditions other than the price and rate
of interest. The power to fix terms ordinarily includes the
power to fix the amount, time and manner of payments to be
made on the purchase price. Nakdimen v. Fort Smith and
Van Buren Bridge Co., 115 Ark. 194, 172 S. W. 272; Federal
Land Bank of New Orleans v. Miller, 199 Miss. 615, 25 So.
2d 11 at 13, City of Clovis v. Southwestern Public Service
Commission, 49 N. M. 270, 161 P. 2d 878 at 886, 161 ALR
504. This question is specifically treated in Words and Phrases
under the title "terms" and at 86 CJS 604, 62 CJ 718, note 85
and 719 note 95. Generally speaking, the phrase means the
right to establish the amount, time and manner of payment,
and there is no case referred to in these digests, nor which counsel has been able to find after a careful search, which holds
that "terms" includes interest.
POINT 6.

PLAINTIFF'S BUYER IS READY AND
WILLING TO PAY SIX PER CENT (6%)
INTEREST.

The original attempted acceptance executed by plaintiffs
buyer was an offer to pay seller's price if she would fix the
terms (Exhibit 2) .
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This buyer's response to the appellant's statement of her
terms indicated a continued willngness by objecting only to
the ten per cent ( 10% ) interest:
''. . . on any reasonable terms other than for cash.
But when you arbitrarily read an exorbitant interest
rate into a written contract, which leaves the rate blank,
you are not reasonable, nor fair, and we will not be
imposed upon just because we want to buy.'' (Exhibit

7)
This buyer recognized, as the statute above cited does, that the
legal interest rate is six per cent ( 6% ) and the letter makes
plain that it is the excessive rate only which is objected to. The
court properly inferred in its findings, that which was implicit
in the letter. Exhibit 7, that the buyer would pay six per cent
(6% ). Also plaintiff informed defendant that his buyer was
willing to meet any terms, with six per cent ( 6%) interest (R.
28).
POINT 7.

ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ALLOWED BY THE COURT.

The court was asked to fix attorney's fees on the basis
of the pleadings and evidence of the appearances which had
been made in the case. (R. 33) There was no objection to
this by the defendant and no comment by the Court.
The Sales Agency Contract (Exhibit 1-P) provided:
"I agree to pay you the commission above stated, and
in case of the employment of an attorney to enforce
any of the terms of this agreement, I agree to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collection."
The Court found that this recital was made in the con-
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tract, that plaintiff was compelled to employ an attorney and
that:
"Plaintiff requested and defenant assented that the
matter of attorney's fees could be fixed by the Court
without evidence other than the files and pleadings
and appearances in connection therewith and the trial
of the case.'' ( R. 89}
And then concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees, R. (89) from which the plaintiff cross appealed.
(R. 92)
The Court has power to award attorney's fees upon the
files and records in the action. John C. Cutler Ass' n v. DeJay
Stores, 3 U. 2d 107, 27a P. 2d 700. And plaintiff was entitled
to attorney's fees in this case.
POINT II.

PLAINTIFF HAS EARNED HIS REAL
ESTATE COMMISSION.

Under the contract between the parties it was not necessary that a sale be consummated before plaintiff had earned
his commission. Under their agreement (Exhibit 1-P) it was
incumbent upon plaintiff to:
''Find a buyer who is ready. able and willing to buy
said property. or any part thereof at said price and
terms, or any other price or terms to which I may agree
in writing. . . ."
It is obvious from the testimony and the documentary evidence
that plaintiff produced a buyer anxious to buy the property,
and able so to do, either for cash or for any terms which the
seller might reasonably specify.-or unreasonably, either, so
long as the interest was at the legal rate.
8
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Defendant told plaintiff and another real estate man that
she had concluded not to sell the property, (R. 76-77) and
these agents informed the defandant that she had sold her
property, and it was up to her to name the terms, "And
we'll conform to it, within reason." (R. 74)
Under the Utah cases, if a real estate broker produces
a buyer ready, willing and able to buy and the seller capriciously or arbitrarily fails or refuses to consummate the transaction, this will not preclude recovery of the commission by
the broker, Hoyt. v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 U. 2d 9, 261
P. 2d 927; Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 U. 2d 354, 267 P. 2d 237.
The Court may be interested in the academic inquiry of
whether the buyer in this case would be entitled to specific
performance. Interesting cases in this field are to be found in
23 ALR 2d 164 at 190-211. also 68 ALR 2d 1221 at 1230-33.
This is a subject for another lawsuit.
POINT 12.

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT UNFAITHFUL
TO DEFENDANT.

Defendant knew that plaintiff's business was real estate
and says she called him with reference to this property because
she wanted him to have the sale. ( R. 40) Then when the
plaintiff brought his earnest money receipt for signature, the
defendant refused to sign and refused to state the terms upon
which she would sell. ( R. 45-46) Since the plaintiff talked
to the defendant concerning the attempted acceptance of the
listing by Bennett Motor Company, there is no question in this
case of misleading or a breach of the fiduciary duty by representing another party. It was known to both parties that the
plaintiff was representing both the buyer and the seller as
agent and was looking to the seller for his commission. The
9
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two cases cited by the appellant are therefore not in point in
this case.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case supports the findings of fact
and shows that plaintiff found a good buyer for the defendant,
ready, willing and able to buy and that all defendant had to do
was sell for cash or indicate the terms she would accept in order
to consummate the transaction. It appears that actually she
had concluded not to sell and so told plainitff and the other
real estate broker. Later. she concluded to submit terms with
an exorbitant interest rate which the buyer again approved and
accepted conditioned upon keeping the interest rate to the legal
rate. As of the time of the trial. and as of the time of this
brief. the buyer is still ready. willing and able to buy if the
seller will stand by her original listing of $43,000 cash or will
state terms with interest at the legal rate.
Respondent has no explanation of why the District Court
did not fix attorney's fees and contends that the case should
be affirmed except as to attorney's fees and that it should be
remanded so that the District Court may fix attorney's fees
upon the records before the Court.
Respectfully submitted.

RICHARDS. BIRD AND HART
Attorneys /or Respondent.
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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